Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine the United Kingdom (UK) Government's handling of the topical and divisive matter of the regulation of 'fracking'. Fracking (shorthand for 'hydraulic fracturing') is a controversial drilling technique used to extract previously inaccessible fossil fuels.
Reports suggest that the UK has significant onshore resources of shale gas, 1 which are now easier to exploit by employing fracking and which offer the possibility of a cheaper, cleaner, and more secure energy supply. As a result, moves are afoot to increase the rate and scale at which fracking takes place. This has met with strong public opposition, 2 but current Government policy (and that unstable parts of the world. 9 Secondly, it believes that an increase in domestic gas supplies will benefit 'the whole of society' 10 by providing 'revenues, growth and jobs -and, of course, affordable bills'. 11 Much has been made of how the development of a UK fracking industry will result in lower gas prices, as it has done in the US, and bring down energy costs for consumers. 12 Thirdly, so long as it replaces coal, shale gas is expected to help the UK to achieve a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, as required by law. 13 Because gas-fired power generation emits less carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane than traditional coal-fired power plants, 14 shale gas is described as a 'bridging fuel' 15 to a greener energy future -at least until other energy sources (eg renewables, nuclear power) become more widely available. Understandably, Government welcomes the prospect of a more consumer-friendly, resilient, and sustainable energy system, which is why shale gas production is described as an 'urgent national priority'.
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The supposed benefits of shale gas are not, however, universally accepted or known for certain. Critics have pointed out that UK shale gas production may not have the desired market impact. 17 This is because production costs in the UK are expected to be high, which will have to be factored into the price at which the gas is sold, and also because the UK may remain part of an integrated European gas market, meaning that any cost benefits from its shale gas development will be diluted.
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The dysfunctional nature of the UK energy market, on which the 'big six' energy 9 DECC, Single Departmental Plan 2015 to 2020 (DECC 2016) pt 1.1. 10 Edward Davey, 'The Myths and Realities of Shale Gas Exploration' (9 September 2013) https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-myths-and-realities-of-shale-gas-exploration accessed 3 September providers have a stranglehold, further means that, even with a plentiful supply of domestic shale gas, a reduction in consumer prices is by no means guaranteed. 19 Additionally, it is argued that the effect of shale gas production on total UK emissions is likely to be small. 20 It is even suggested that global emissions of greenhouse gases could increase if the fossil fuels displaced by shale gas (eg coal or liquefied gas) are exported and burnt elsewhere. 21 The issue is that '[t]he climate does not care where the CO2 comes from, whether it is from gas, from coal, from the UK or from China'.
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As well as having potentially long-term impacts on the climate, fracking also poses immediate and localised risks which are of significant public concern. These include risks of groundwater contamination caused by the leakage of fracking fluids; surface spills of fuel or waste water; local air pollution from the on-site flaring of gas; increased traffic movement, noise, and dust; damage to neighbouring property from seismic activity; disturbance to natural habitats caused by construction and drilling; and visual intrusion into the local landscape by buildings and drilling rigs. 23 Yet, there is considerable uncertainty as to the nature and scale of possible harms, which is attributed to the very limited amount of fracking to have taken place in the UK and a corresponding lack of data. It is noted that, because only a few wells have been drilled (and only one has been 'fracked'), there is 'a risk that the data they reveal may not be representative'.
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Consequently it is too soon to draw firm conclusions about the extent of the UK's shale gas resources or their recoverability, making it difficult to assess the seriousness of the risks or the value of the benefits. 27 For example, a public dialogue exercise found that participants with negative views of fracking were also those who felt that 'the government had already taken a position on shale gas and oil at a national level if not locally' and that 'exploration would most likely go ahead regardless of public opposition'.
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These additional layers of doubt have received little
Government attention, except where they are seen as potential barriers to shale gas development -in which case they are viewed as temporary, practical inconveniences ('when people start to see the benefit … they will see that it is quite right that this is part of our long-term economic plan'
)
rather than more persistent and deep-seated issues requiring serious consideration. As far as policy goes, they are 'non-issues'. ) and it also, inevitably, invites generalisations about the regulatory regime as a whole.
Indeed, the totalising image of fracking regulation conveys completeness and control, even though it does not reflect the finer points of law in this area -after all, it would defeat the purpose of the Regulatory Roadmap to detail every aspect of the regulation. As Scott reminds us, a map is designed to abstract and summarise. In fact, the completeness of a map, he says, 'depends, in a curious way, on its abstract sketchiness, its lack of detail -its thinness'.
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The visual representation of regulation in abstract form is one way in which the regulatory domain is set out, but there are additional interpretive techniques -or 'knowledge moves'
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-used by Government in arguing that existing legislation applies to fracking. They are as follows.
Regulation by Analogy
Government's claim that fracking is subject to robust regulation depends, at least in part, on its depiction of fracking as analogous to 'conventional' methods of oil and gas extraction. It sees fracking as new, but not so new that additional regulatory provision is required. 'Newness' is at the core of technological innovation but, with a few notable exceptions, 49 its significance for regulation is rarely mentioned. The general literature on technology distinguishes between two broad types of innovation: 'incremental' and 'radical'. The former is characterised by a 'natural trajectory' 50 of successive improvements on existing products or processes, while the latter pains to emphasise that fracking has already been used in the UK (albeit offshore rather than on land). 55 The analogy is also pursued in relation to risk. Government argues that the categories of risk associated with fracking are not unique and apply to any one of a number of techniques used to exploit fossil fuel reserves -the implication being that regulators are already equipped to deal with them. Government puts considerable importance on the fact that the UK has a 'strong track and 'over 50 years of experience of regulating the onshore oil and gas industry nationally'. 57 And since the techniques used in fracking for shale gas are 'broadly similar to those used in existing onshore gas and oil extraction methods', it follows that fracking 'will be covered by the same robust safety and environmental regulatory regime'.
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Broad, Multilevel Regulatory Coverage
Government claims that existing regulatory measures cover fracking despite not having been designed for such purpose. In doing so, it makes four types of argument. The first relates to the quantity of applicable measures. Fracking cannot be described as unregulated as it comes within the scope of a large number of legislative regimes on public health, workplace safety, and the environment. These are areas of shared competence between the EU and Member States, 59 resulting in a complex of interrelated rules and procedures across different regulatory areas and jurisdictional levels. Decisions concerning national energy provision remain the prerogative of Member States, 60 which is why the UK has been able unilaterally to enact legislation governing the exploration and production of fossil fuels. 61 On top of this, numerous measures of EU legislation (36 according to one estimate 62 ) are relevant to the health and environmental aspects of fracking, even though they contain no mention of either 'fracking' or 'shale gas'. Government is keen to point out that all drilling operations, whether or not they involve fracking, 'must comply with a comprehensive set of health and safety regulations'. important that the regulations are of general application, in that they do not address a particular technology or distinguish between different fossil fuels. For instance, a prospective operator must apply for and obtain a Petroleum Exploration and Development Licence from DECC before it can search for and extract 'petroleum'.
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The definition of 'petroleum' is clearly wide enough to encompass shale gas as it includes 'any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbon and natural gas existing in its natural condition in strata'.
65 A further example can be found in planning law. Before carrying out 'development', the operator requires planning permission from the minerals planning authority (a unit of the local authority). Since 'development' is defined as including 'mining or other operations in, on, over or under land', 66 it is sufficiently broad to cover fracking -and because no distinction is drawn between the various kinds of 'mining or other operations', the requirement of planning permission is taken to apply to fracking as it does to any other method of drilling.
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To give the planning authority a more detailed account of the likely environmental effects, the operator may be required to complete an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the proposed development before planning permission will be granted. Neither of the Annexes makes reference to 'fracking', but they do list broad categories of activity into which fracking could fall. Annex I, for example, includes the category 'extraction of petroleum and natural gas for commercial purposes', 70 and Annex II lists projects in the 'extractive industry', including those involving 'deep drilling' -which can reasonably be regarded as covering fracking, even though the categories do not say so. It is because of their definitional breadth that fracking is assumed to come within their purview; hence there is no question of shortcomings or gaps in the law.
The third argument is that existing regulations cover the entire life cycle of fracking operations. General planning policy, for example, dictates that planning permission is required not just for the full-scale production of onshore oil and gas but also for the initial exploration and appraisal phases of development. 71 Planning policy is overlaid by legislation addressing a range of concerns from the design and construction of wells, 72 to the flaring of gas. 73 Over the course of the fracking project, the operator also has to obtain a number of environmental permits from the Environment Agency. 74 A permit is needed for any of the regulated activities contained in the legislation. 75 As one might expect, fracking is not specified but would come within the terms of several classes of activity at different stages of the process -including 'a groundwater activity'
(where there is a risk of discharges into groundwater) and a 'water discharge activity' (if surface water run-off becomes polluted, eg due to a spill of flowback fluid) during drilling operations, and 'a mining waste activity' at the point of waste disposal.
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The fourth, related argument is that existing regulations also deal with a host of different sectoral concerns. Alongside the corpus of environmental legislation are various measures on occupational health and safety. These require an operator, for example, to adopt safe working practices for all 'borehole operations'
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-including drilling for petroleum (again, broadly defined as 'any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbon and natural gas'
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). Prior to drilling, the operator must notify the Health and Safety Executive of any hazards, monitoring arrangements and details of the well design to show that it will 'so far as is reasonably practicable be safe'. 79 This applies regardless of whether the applicant proposes to drill for conventional or unconventional oil or gas. EU chemicals legislation is also relevant to on-site safety management, even though it does not explicitly deal with fracking. 80 For instance, an operator in receipt of chemicals used in fracking fluids would fall within the meaning of a 'downstream user' 81 and therefore be obliged to take appropriate steps to ensure that any risks are properly controlled. 82 Together, the many legislative regimes across a range of sectors set the bounds of the 'regulatory domain'. It is because these regimes are technology-neutral, 83 and are geared to such broad categories of subject (eg chemicals, petroleum operations, polluting activities) and object (eg safety), that the regulatory domain is so expansive.
Regulatory Continuity
Clearly, there is no shortage of regulation in this area and the breadth of legislative coverage is vast. And given that fracking is seen as functionally equivalent to conventional drilling techniques, there is no break in regulatory continuity. The idea that existing regulation will continue to apply also rests on the argument that the regulation is well-suited to the task of coping with technological advance. What is interesting is that the policy preoccupation with regulatory coverage has a tendency to produce conclusions of regulatory adequacy. No account is taken of the conditions attaching to the various licences and permissions needed for fracking, or of the suitability of specific regulatory requirements given their interpretation and enforcement in practice (eg how do operators ensure that fracking is 'safe' and take 'appropriate steps to control risks'?). It is enough that the conditions and requirements apply;
whether or not they are appropriate for regulating fracking remains largely undiscussed. Such deference to existing rules and suppositions of efficacy is, to some degree, built into the regulatory structure. For example, in the planning system, minerals planning authorities are instructed to 'assume that the regulatory regime is appropriate and will operate effectively'. 85 Similarly, a review
The European Commission finds that, although EU legislation is prima facie applicable to fracking, 'the interpretation of applicable EU legislation is unclear, while other environmental problems remain unaddressed'. 94 Here we see a clear separation of questions of coverage and adequacy, and a reluctance on the part of the Commission to treat them as one and the same issue.
A similar line of reasoning is followed by the European Parliament, which notes that, notwithstanding the many relevant regulations, it is 'unclear whether the current regulatory framework of EU legislation provides an adequate guarantee against the risks … resulting from shale gas activities'. to have significant effects on the environment, and is either larger than one hectare or located in a protected area (such as an area of outstanding natural beauty). 97 The trouble is that it is not obvious that fracking projects would fulfill these criteria as a matter of course. As regards Annex I, shale gas drilling may have little trouble crossing the 500,000 cubic metres per day threshold during stages of full-scale commercial production, but will probably fail to yield such volumes of gas during the exploration phase -and even so, site operators will not know the rate of productivity at the outset. The difficulty with Annex II (as transposed in the UK 98 ) is that, provided the project is not located in a protected area, the operator can avoid having to conduct an EIA by proposing works of one hectare or less. This is evident in a number of examples in the UK, where planning applications have been made for sites of up to 0.99 hectares in size. 99 The European Parliament has said it finds it highly unsatisfactory that fracking sites 'are not generally subject to an environmental impact assessment despite the environmental risks of such projects'. 100 So, when the EIA Directive was reviewed in 2012, the Parliament sought to introduce a requirement that an EIA should be conducted for all shale gas activities involving fracking. Council. At the Council, the UK strenuously opposed the introduction of a mandatory EIA and reportedly played 'a leading part' 102 in the backlash, forming a blocking minority to prevent the adoption of Parliament's more stringent proposals on shale gas. 103 This proved successful, and the requirement of a mandatory EIA for fracking activities was removed before the revised Directive was agreed upon. 
Regulatory Dexterity
So far, the article has looked at how UK policy on the regulation of fracking is the product of Government's single-minded commitment to the existing regulatory domain and the coverage it affords. Such a focus on coverage has meant that the policy contains little discussion of either the suitability of existing regulations or the manner of their implementation. As a result, Government has shown an unwillingness to consider proposals for legislative reform tabled by UK policy actors 111 or EU institutions. 112 The remainder of the article addresses a subtle but important variation in Government's approach -one that is at odds with the arguments heard so far.
Although Government's arguments about regulatory coverage dominate, limited exceptions have been carved out of the domain and set aside for regulatory amendment. Here, Government has singled out parts of the regulatory domain as defective and in need of reformwhich is in direct contrast with its unquestioning acceptance of the coverage (and hence adequacy) of existing regulatory arrangements. These regulatory 'outliers' are important because they tell a different story. Instead of portraying existing regulations as applicable and robust, Government has moved swiftly to introduce new regulatory measures for fracking, including new items of legislation. So while the 'regulatory domain' gives a sense of fixedness, immutability, and abstraction, the approach described now involves greater agility, quick reflexes, and a higher level of precision -hence the term 'regulatory dexterity'. And whereas the domain rests on techniques of mapping and analogy, and so on, dexterity is driven by its own logics of interpretation, each giving force to the idea that the law needs updating. These dexterity-producing interpretations will now be examined as isolated departures from the prevailing image of the regulatory domain.
They place great emphasis on technological dissimilarity (not analogy), concrete legal rules (not regulation in the abstract), specific regulatory adequacies (not broad regulatory coverage), and changes to national legislation (not an insistence on the continuity and comprehensiveness of multilevel regulatory regimes).
Technological Dissimilarity
We saw above that one reason for thinking that fracking is adequately dealt with by existing regulations is that it is considered to be analogous to established methods of drilling. There are cases, however, in which that analogy is turned on its head and Government's focus is on the differences between fracking and other drilling operations. Unlike arguments that fracking is functionally equivalent to 'conventional' processes of extraction, the emphasis here is on the market-transforming potential of a new supply of shale gas. 113 Whereas, in establishing the 'regulatory domain', Government concentrates on the similarities between fracking and conventional drilling in terms of technological process and categories of risk, arguments of 'regulatory dexterity' are made on the basis that fracking has a substantially different end product, and offers new and remarkable benefits compared with traditional gas production.
The distinction between technological processes and products applies in several areas of law to varying effect. 114 In the context of fracking, it is strategically deployed to sustain claims of both 'domain' and 'dexterity'. Fracking may be an 'incrementally' innovative process (which continues to be regulated by existing legislation) but can result in a 'radically' innovative product new resource',
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'an exciting new prospect for diversifying our energy supplies', 117 and 'alternative'
to other fossil fuels. 118 It is also distinguished in terms of its market impact, as it is said to have 'the potential to kickstart a whole new industry'. 119 Government lays particular stress on the 'new' benefits of shale gas, setting it apart from conventional energy sources. The greater the perceived differences, the easier it is to justify a new regulatory approach. A further distinction is drawn in respect of costs, since fracking is expected to involve a high initial outlay and longer periods of unprofitability than conventional onshore and even offshore oil and gas projects. 120 All of these distinguishing features (new product, new benefits, new costs) help to separate shale gas fracking from other types of extractive activity for regulatory purposes, and it is by creating some conceptual distance that the prospect of fracking-specific reform begins to materialise.
Concrete Legal Rules and their Inadequacies
As is it not shameful that so far there has been only one exploratory well drilled in this country and that the industry is clear that the reason for the snail's pace of progress is the mind-boggling bureaucratic complexity of the regulatory system in this country?
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Specific aspects of the regulatory system to attract Government criticism include the planning regime, which is apparently susceptible to 'slow and confused decision making amongst councils'. 123 In a joint statement, DECC and DCLG cautioned that '[i]f planning applications for shale exploration developments take months or even years it can create uncertainty for communities and prevent the development of a potentially vital national industry'. 124 The law on access to land has also been criticised for imposing unduly burdensome obligations on fracking companies and creating a disincentive to investment in shale gas projects in the UK. Until recently, land access in this context was governed by trespass law. In order to avoid committing an actionable trespass, a company wishing to drill beneath land belonging to another first had to seek permission from the landowner or tenant. involving land with unregistered title. Moreover, under trespass law, a single landholder was able to obstruct fracking development simply by withholding permission. Where a landholder unreasonably refused to grant access or demanded unreasonable terms for its grant, the shale gas company may have been entitled to apply to the court for the compulsory acquisition of ancillary rights over (or under) land pursuant to the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966. 127 This is known to be a lengthy and costly process, however, and so Government did not want gas companies routinely having to resort to the 1966 Act. 128 To overcome problems of uncertainty, expense, and delay, Government has adopted several new initiatives to expedite the regulatory process for shale gas operations. These include guidance for minerals planning authorities on how shale gas applications should proceed through the planning system, 129 and policies giving the Secretary of State the additional power to 'call-in' a planning application and 'recover' a planning appeal for his own determination. 130 The use of revisable guidance and standards of practice ensures that the content of existing regulation remains the same but its application is updated to reflect the changing technological circumstances. In this regard, 'regulatory dexterity' has a role to play in preserving the stability of 'regulatory domain' -by leaving the substantive rules untouched and making new arrangements for implementation.
'Dexterity' has also been used, however, to replace certain substantive rules entirely.
Government has enacted new legislation in areas of finance, planning permission, and land access, with the aim of removing obstacles to shale gas development. It is vital to note that the previous law in these areas would have covered fracking -it is not as though Government was seeking to fill gaps in legal provision. For example, the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966 already offered a regime whereby operators could gain access to, or under, the land of another.
Likewise, the planning system already dealt with applications for development involving the onshore extraction of oil and gas -remember that the UK has 'a strong track record' and 'over 50 years of experience' behind it. 131 Similarly, oil and gas development was already subject to several types of tax. 132 Government could conceivably have regarded these measures as coming within the 'regulatory domain' and as continuing to apply without modification. On the issue of fracking, however, it construes existing regulation on finance, planning permission, and land access as both inadequate and requiring a complete overhaul. The UK is, of course, free to legislate in these areas because EU Member States retain competence to determine their own national energy mix. 133 In the following examples, the UK has used its national competence to introduce technology-specific legislation to increase the speed and scale at which fracking takes place. They are, in other words, illustrations of 'regulatory dexterity' in action.
New Fracking-Specific Legislation
The first example of 'regulatory dexterity' is the newly established tax regime for shale gas activities, described by the Chancellor as 'the most generous for shale in the world'. 134 The Finance Act 2014
introduces an 'onshore allowance' to support the development of shale gas projects that are economic but not commercially viable under the usual tax arrangements. 135 Prior to the Act, profits from oil and gas extraction were taxed at a rate of 62% (30% corporation tax plus a 32% supplementary charge). The new onshore allowance exempts a portion of those profits from the supplementary charge, resulting in an effective tax rate of just 30%. 136 The Finance Act 2014 also extends the ring fence expenditure supplement to protect companies embarking on shale gas projects from high start-up costs and an initial period of likely unprofitability. Previously, the supplement allowed onshore oil and gas companies to uplift their losses by 10% for up to six accounting periods, in order to maintain their value until they could be offset against future profits. 137 The Act extends the number of claims available to onshore oil and gas companies to ten accounting periods, allowing them to maintain the value of their losses for longer.
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Furthermore, new Business Rates Retention legislation in England means that local authorities will be able to keep 100% (rather than the standard 50%) of the business rates collected from shale oil and gas sites. 139 Such fiscal measures aim to make the UK 'an attractive, competitive opportunity for global operators' 140 and to create the right economic conditions for the shale industry to flourish.
Secondly, Government hastily introduced two instruments of secondary legislation to lessen the burden of the planning process. The first of these removes the obligation on fracking operators to notify individual owners or tenants to whose land the planning application relates.
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The second effectively reduces the planning application fee for development involving fracking.
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In its race to introduce these changes, however, Government allowed only limited opportunity for access. There are restrictions on the right -for example, it cannot be exercised at depths of less than 300 metres below the surface, or in 'protected areas' at depths of less than 1,200 metres.
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But given that fracking is expected to take place two to three kilometres underground, these restrictions are likely to have little practical effect. 154 The important point is that, in this setting, the rules of trespass and of compulsory rights under the 1966 Act have become redundant, which should make it quicker and simpler for shale gas companies to proceed with development. That is, after all, the main reason for Government's selective approach to streamlining the law.
Domain and Dexterity Together
Having established that the UK Government relies on two different types of regulatory strategy, the article now turns to consider their significance together rather than as separate phenomena. 154 Although the Act precludes the drilling of wells at the surface in specified protected areas, it does not prevent deep horizontal drilling (≥ 1,200 metres) beneath protected areas provided that the rigs are located outside the perimeter.
regulation -they are complementary inasmuch as they strengthen each other's influence and authority.
Lastly, and related to this, 'regulatory domain' and 'regulatory dexterity' both operate to the same end; that is to say, both are employed to advance the development of the UK's fracking industry. Clearly, Government wants to have a foot in both camps when it suits its policy objectives. Here we see how 'domain' and 'dexterity' work in conjunction with each other, not just as descriptive accounts of regulation but by seeking to bring certain technological realities into being. Together they have a projective and 'performative' effect. 'Domain' and 'dexterity' act in concert to facilitate shale gas development in the UK -by resisting the introduction of frackingspecific legislation where it threatens to impede technological progress ('domain'), and by pressing for legislative reform designed to streamline the regulatory process for fracking ('dexterity'). They depict fracking both as equivalent to conventional drilling that is already comprehensively regulated ('domain') and as involving such transformative change that it requires a dedicated regulatory regime ('dexterity'). Both depictions play a role in legitimating the UK's pro-fracking 
Conclusion
The UK Government's regulatory response to fracking showcases some of the many ways in which law relates to technology. A critical analysis of Government's strategy and actions reveals two distinct regulatory schemas -'regulatory domain' and 'regulatory dexterity' -each relying on different interpretive conventions and different methods of approaching regulation. Arguments of 'regulatory domain' reflect the understanding that, because fracking is already covered by existing regulation, it does not warrant further legislation. Such arguments position regulation in its totality, abstracting general principles of regulation to convey a sense of comprehensiveness and control. From this perspective, fracking is seen as analogous to established drilling methods and therefore subject to the same legislative requirements. Given that regulatory coverage is broad and exists at both EU and UK levels, it is assumed to afford adequate protection against the potential health and environmental risks. Owing to the already robust regulatory framework, Government has rejected proposals for reform.
Whereas the regulatory domain (covering health, safety, and the environment) develops an untouchable quality, other issues -in this instance, finance, planning permission, and land access -are open to revaluation. This second approach, referred to here as 'regulatory dexterity', conceives of fracking as dissimilar from conventional drilling methods and in need of targeted regulatory reform. It switches the emphasis from the question of regulatory coverage to that of overcoming concrete regulatory inadequacies. In order to reduce the apparent uncertainty, delay and expense associated with the regulatory system -which, curiously enough, are treated as problems for fracking but not for other types of technological development -Government has introduced several measures of fracking-specific regulation through the passage of new legislation.
It is worth bearing in mind that, even if they seem to be inevitable ways of 'doing' regulation, neither 'domain' nor 'dexterity' emerges of its own accord. Each involves taking a clear interpretive stance on issues like the novelty of fracking and the sufficiency of existing regulatory provision. Moreover, the dividing line between 'domain' and 'dexterity' is not fixed but varies depending on how each schema may be used to enable fracking to develop. It just so happens that the rules on finance, planning permission, and land access are the selected targets of regulatory dexterity -but they could easily have been construed as parts of the regulatory domain, had their reform not raised the prospect of a more fracking-friendly regulatory environment. So 'domain'
and 'dexterity' do not come prepackaged but are open to strategic interpretation. Crucially, what at first sight appear to be inconsistent approaches to regulation turn out to have a close affinity with each other. Despite the fact that 'domain' and 'dexterity' produce diverse combinations of slow and fast, old and new, sameness and difference, stasis and change, both are used to achieve the same technological result. Their oppositional qualities strengthen and legitimise the case for fracking by ensuring that the regulation is both stable and responsive, both long-standing and up to date, both general and specific. The implications of regulation purporting to be all things at all times, and the normative pull of 'domain' and 'dexterity' towards a particular technological end, deserve closer attention than they have recently found. This article 'drills deeper' into the tactical uses of regulation when faced with a seemingly unmissable technological opportunity.
